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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1372 
___________ 
 
QINGMEI DONG a/k/a Quinmei Dong, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A093-043-228) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 6, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 7, 2014) 
 
___________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Qingmei Dong petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by 
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the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons detailed below, we will deny 
the petition for review.   
 Dong is a citizen of China.  She arrived in the United States in November 2002, 
and in 2009, the Department of Homeland Security charged her with being removable as 
an alien who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Dong conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   
 Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Dong testified in support of her applications.  
She alleged that she was entitled to relief because (1) she has had two children in the 
United States and thus, under China’s family-planning policies, would be subject to 
sterilization or fines; and (2) she has begun to practice Christianity in the United States, 
intends to join an underground church in China, and would be persecuted in China for 
practicing her faith.  The IJ denied all relief, concluding that Dong had failed to meet her 
respective burdens of proof.   
 Dong then appealed to the BIA, which dismissed her appeal.  The BIA ruled, as to 
Dong’s claims concerning China’s family-planning policies, that Dong had failed to 
present sufficient evidence to show that she faced a reasonable possibility of suffering 
economic persecution or sterilization.  The BIA also concluded that Dong had failed to 
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in China on account of her 
Christianity.  Thus, the BIA rejected Dong’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.  
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Finally, the BIA ruled that Dong had failed to show that it was more likely than not that 
she would be tortured in China, and hence denied relief on the CAT claim.  Dong then 
filed a timely petition for review in this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the BIA issued its own 
opinion, we review its decision rather than the IJ’s.  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 
339 (3d Cir. 2012).  We must uphold the agency’s factual findings, including its findings 
as to whether Dong has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution, if they 
are “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).  We 
will reverse a finding of fact only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  § 1252(b)(4)(B).   
 In pressing her asylum and withholding-of-removal claims, Dong does not claim 
that she was previously persecuted in China; rather, she argues that she will be persecuted 
in the future if removed to China.  A future-persecution claim requires the applicant to 
demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution and that her fear is objectively reasonable.  
See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005).  To satisfy the objective prong, the 
applicant must show either that (1) she would be individually singled out for persecution 
or (2) there is a pattern or practice in the home country of persecuting similarly situated 
people.  Id.   
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 Dong’s primary argument is that if she returns to China, she will be sterilized.  See 
generally Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2011) (requiring asylum 
applicant to show “a reasonable likelihood that he or she will be forcibly sterilized upon 
repatriation” (quotation marks omitted)).  The BIA denied relief, relying primary on the 
2007 China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions Report, which states that 
China “prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit to 
sterilization,” and that foreign-born children are not counted for purposes of China’s 
family-planning rules.  This Court has previously upheld a BIA conclusion, founded on 
the same report, that a woman in Dong’s position would not be sterilized in China.  See 
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 
F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008) (“This Court has repeatedly recognized that State 
Department reports may constitute substantial evidence.”).   
 Dong argues that, rather than relying on this State Department report, the BIA 
should have credited memos purportedly from a neighborhood board and a village 
committee that, at least generally, support her claim.  The BIA “accorded limited weight” 
to those documents because, in its view, they were not properly authenticated.  Dong 
does not squarely challenge this conclusion; rather, she argues only that the BIA’s 
discussion of the authentication requirements was inadequate.  We disagree.  The BIA 
specifically stated that the full extent of Dong’s authentication was an unsworn letter 
from an interested witness (her brother) who was not subject to cross-examination.  Dong 
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had the burden of authenticating her evidence, see Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 274 
(3d Cir. 2014), and it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that she failed to meet that 
burden here, see Chen, 676 F.3d at 117; see also Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218-20 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
 It was also reasonable for the BIA to place limited weight on an excerpt of the 
2006 Congressional-Executive Commission on China because that report, unlike the 
2007 Profile of Asylum Claims, does not specifically discuss how family-planning rules 
are applied to citizens (like Dong) whose children were born in the United States rather 
than China.  The same analysis applies to letters that Dong provided from her mother and 
her neighbor.  While the women claimed that they had been sterilized, their children were 
born in China.  Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 
finding that Dong failed to show a likelihood that she would be forcibly sterilized in 
China.   
 Dong further argues that, even if her violation of family-planning rules would not 
result in sterilization, it would cause her to be persecuted economically.  The BIA 
rejected this claim, observing that the country-conditions evidence in the record “reflects 
a wide variation in the amount of social compensation fees,” and that Dong had not 
established that the fees (if any) that she would be required to pay would cause her severe 
economic disadvantage.  That rationale is entirely consistent with this Court’s authority, 
see Chen, 676 F.3d at 116-17, and is supported by substantial evidence. 
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 Dong’s challenge to the BIA’s rejection of her religious-persecution claim fares no 
better.  The documentary evidence in the record, which includes the State Department’s 
2010 International Religious Freedom Report and the 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims, 
shows that the Chinese government’s treatment of religious groups varies from region to 
region, and that, in some cases, unregistered churches operate without repercussions.  
Thus, Dong cannot establish the requisite “systemic, pervasive, or organized” persecution 
to sustain a pattern-or-practice claim.  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537-38.  Nor did Dong present any 
evidence to suggest that she faced an individualized risk of persecution.  See Ni v. 
Holder, 635 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011).  Thus, substantial evidence supports the 
BIA’s conclusion that Dong failed to establish that she would be persecuted in the future, 
and the BIA therefore did not err in denying Dong’s asylum and withholding-of-removal 
claims. 
 Dong’s challenge to the BIA’s rejection of her CAT claim likewise lacks merit.  
To prevail, Dong must show that the record compels the conclusion “‘that it is more 
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 
removal.’”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c)(2)).  Here, Dong has presented no evidence beyond that which the BIA 
concluded was insufficient to establish that she would be persecuted in China, which will 
not suffice.  See generally Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
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“torture requires proof of something more severe than the kind of treatment that would 
suffice to prove persecution”). 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
